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Ratiocination and Socrates’ Daim: A Practical Solution
Anthony K. Jensen, Emory University
Presented at the Janury, 2005, Meeting o f the SAGP 
with the American Philological Association, in Boston
Recent accounts of Socrates’ daimonion normally begin by pointing out the 
apparent contradiction between Socrates’ commitment to obey natural reason and his 
commitment to obey divine commands. Scholars have asked which of these two 
commitments “wins” or “trumps” the other when they come into conflict. Two in 
particular, Gregory Vlastos and C.D.C Reeve, have argued with cited passages that 
Socrates will always and everywhere follow his natural reason, doing only those actions 
which seem best after a rigorous elenctic testing. On the other hand, M.L. McPherran,
T.C. Brickhouse, and N.D. Smith have each emphasized the many clear instances of 
respect Socrates shows for oracles, possessions, and what is of special concern for our 
interests in this essay, the promptings of his daimonion or divine sign. From 1989-1991 
this debate spilled onto the pages of the Times Literary Supplement and several important 
journals, only to be cut short prior to any clear resolution by the passing of Professor 
Vlastos.1
It is my purpose in this essay to bring some fresh ideas to this once lively debate. 
The first step will be to clarify the precise nature of the daimonion by both understanding 
its role in the Socratic dialogues and briefly surveying the antecedent sources upon which 
Socrates drew to justify the existence of this quasi-mystical phenomenon in the eyes of 
popular Greek culture. Secondly, I shall argue that neither does reason “trump” the 
daimonion nor does the daimonion “trump” reason, therein attempting split the horns of 
the dilemma. Since I believe these two commitments have different objects under their 
sphere of authority and may not in any way be considered to “trump” one another, I think 
Socrates can and does maintain both a commitment to obey reason and a commitment to 
obey divine signs. Both are a part of his character, and he follows both without hesitation.
I
Socrates’ commitment to follow reason in intellectual matters is evident 
throughout the Socratic Dialogues. Indeed, Socrates is the consummate intellectualist, 
believing even that virtue is knowledge and thereupon grounding even a moral theory in 
terms of discursive rationality. The extreme consequence of following this intellectualist 
line of thought is that extra-rational religious experiences do not contribute significantly 
to the pursuit of the examined philosophical life.2 At best, divine signs serve as a sort of 
‘pat on the back’ once reason has decided the best course of action in a given 
circumstance. On this line it is not at all difficult to see why some of Socrates’ accusers in 
the Apology understand him to have been a kind of atheist: his positive references to 
divine beings and signs must only be examples of the famous Socratic Irony.3 This 
position is at least plausible in light of what he says in the Crito:
1T l Not only now for the first time but always, I am the sort of man who is persuaded 
by nothing in me except the proposition which appears to me to be best when I 
reason about it. ( C r i .45b)
While this is the best passage in support of the Vlastos/Reeve line, which we shall 
explicate more fully in a moment, it is nevertheless important to understand that Socrates 
is claiming to follow natural reason in opposition to divine signs. Divination is not 
exactly what Socrates has in mind as the alternative here; rather it is Crito’s concern for 
the opinions and threats of the mob that Socrates rejects in favour of reason in this 
passage.
In any case, this current position aims to deflate the influence of the extrarational 
inspiration that guides Socrates in “matters great and small” (Ap. 40a4-6). After all, his 
entire philosophical mission was said to be inspired by his unwavering faith in the 
Delphic Oracle’s dictum that ‘no one was wiser than Socrates’ 20e3). His choice of 
the philosophical way of life was neither simply not the result of a rational inquiry, but 
instead a divine commandment.
T2 To do this [follow philosophy] has been commanded me, as I maintain, by the god 
through divinations and through dreams and every other means through which 
divine apportionment has ever commanded anyone to do anything. (Ap.33c3-5)
There is no shortage of occasions on which Socrates takes divine messages seriously.4 In 
particular, Socrates unqualifiedly puts his trust in the signaling or non-signaling of his 
divine sign, his daimonion. Plato’s Socrates was a man convinced that human reason was 
fallible and that his own wisdom -unsurpassed by any other mortal’s- is “worth little or 
nothing” whereas only the “god is truly wise” How, then, could he choose
to trust his own reason above the signs and commands of divinity? At this point, we are 
hung upon a very significant dilemma: does Socrates obey his commitment to reason or 
his commitment to divine influence?
II
To focus the discussion of whether the daimonion “trumps” reason or vice versa, 
it is necessary to first understand what exactly this divine sign is. As best one can tell 
from the dialogues, Socrates’ daimonion is an internal, private admonitory sign6, a voice 
caused to appear within the horizon of consciousness by a semi-divine .7 He
believes that it has occurred to few or none before him (i?ep.496c3-5)8 and has been his 
constant companion since childhood (4p.31d2-4; 77ig.l28d3). The s
intervention in both his great and small affairs (ApA0dA-6) is well known by his 
associates (Ap.31c7-dl; £u.3b5-7). It operates by giving him a warning signal not to 
pursue some course of action he is about to begin 242b8; 77ig.l28d4-6). The 
warning is itself understood as unfailingly correct (Xen. Mem. 1.1.3-5), whether about 
Socrates (or perhaps one of Socrates’ associates) actions.9 Noticeably, it never provides 
Socrates with a rational argument explaining why Socrates was mistaken to think this 
action would have been for the best. It never provides Socrates any reason as to why it 
signals him at a particular time. And it is never open to interpretation at the moment it
2signals, as are other extrarational sources of insight.10 It simply signals him. In each case, 
Socrates responds by immediately ceasing whatever he was about to do.11
So much for what is said about the daimonion and the daemon in the writings of 
Plato. To fill in important details about what Socrates may have understood by his special 
sign, we turn now to three popular accounts from Homer, Hesiod, and Empedocles, 
authors with whom Socrates was certainly not unfamiliar. This will by no means be an 
exhaustive account of all the complexities surrounding this most variegated set of beliefs, 
but a brief sketch which intends only to highlight certain elements in the tradition that are 
relevant to our current discussion.
The earliest discussions of daemons that bear some similarity to those of Socrates 
are preserved in Homer. In both the Illiad and the there are several of examples
of personages ascribing all sorts of mental events to the intervention of a nameless and 
indeterminate daemon}2 These vaguely conceived beings can inspire courage at a crisis 
{Ody.9.381) or take away a man’s understanding of what he does (Ody. 14.178).
Following E.R. Dodds, they are also credited with a wide range of what may be called 
‘monitions’.13 “Whenever someone has a particularly brilliant or foolish idea; when he 
suddenly recognizes another person’s identity or sees in a flash the meaning of an omen,
.. .he or someone else will see in it a psychic intervention by one of those anonymous 
supernatural beings.”14 Almost any idea or action that ‘pops’ into a person’s head without 
rational consideration and is not thought to be the intervention of a specific deity, such as 
Apollo or Aphrodite, is fairly called the work of a daemon}* The reference to a daemon 
often implies a negative or harmful outcome of the action (e.g., Ody. 15.172,12.38, 
14.488). And finally, for Homer, the daemones do not represent a different type of 
immortals besides the divine gods.16
In Hesiod, the picture is quite different. “Now that the earth has gathered over this 
generation, these are called pure and blessed spirits; they live upon the earth, and are 
good, they watch over mortal men and defend them from evil; they keep watch over 
lawsuits and hard doings; they mantle themselves in dark mist and wander all over the 
country; they bestow wealth; for this right as of kings was given to them” ( Works 
and Days, 122-6). The daemones for Hesiod are men of the golden age raised up by the 
will of Zeus, designed to watch over men and protect them in their practical affairs. In 
the Theogony, we see Phaethon raised by Aphrodite from the world of mortality, having 
become a “godlike daemon” ( Theogny, 991). The way by which they watch over their
charges is unfortunately not described by Hesiod, but perhaps we can extrapolate 
something from what he does say. “Upon the earth there are thirty thousand immortal 
daemones, who keep watch for Zeus over all men do" ( Works and Days, 253-5; 
emphasis mine). Somewhat like the Furies, they deal justice on the behalf on Zeus for 
particular evil actions, a point which I believe will be an important element of Socrates’ 
understanding several generations later. Finally, in the Cratylus Plato has Socrates praise 
Hesiod’s rendition of the daemones as good spirits, as opposed to the mischievous spirits 
of Homer, with two important addenda: one, the daemones are said to be wise and 
knowing, and, two, every good man, whether alive or dead, is correctly called a daemon 
(Crat., 397el-398c3).17 As a further similarity, for Hesiod the daemones wander the 
earth, taking note of right and wrong, observing justice and injustice, dispensing riches, 
and watching over mortals: compare this to the entity that watched over Socrates when he 
was to enter politics, took note of the wrong action he was about to do, and by means of
3guiding Socrates away from a bad career choice, had endowed him all the riches of a 
philosophical life.
Our third account comes from Empedocles. Here daemones are seen as individual 
beings which dwell in men and in other natural creatures, beings fallen to the corporeal 
world, who must pass through many different life forms until they may at last hope for 
release. In the introduction to his poem on Nature, which is said to have its origin in 
daemonic inspiration -daemones who have once led his soul down to this earthly Vale of 
Grief (fr. 121, 4)18- he describes how, by ancient decree of the gods and the compulsion 
of Necessity, every daemon came to be polluted and banished from the company of the 
blessed (fr. 115,3).19 On Empedocles’ account, the earthly inhabitance of the daemones 
represents their punishment for having transgressed certain laws set upon them by higher 
divinities. Once inside a person, responsibility falls on the person inhabited to keep the 
daemon free from sin (frr. 136-7, 128, 9), usually by asceticism (frr. 23, 11, 144), in 
order that the daemon might, after several lifetimes of purifications, be freed to reenter 
the domain of the gods. Empedocles regards his own daemon as being in the final stage 
of such purification, next in line to divinity proper. While Empedocles is somewhat 
recalcitrant when it comes to explaining what they actually do, his description of the 
nature of daemones bears a striking resemblance to the transmigration theory that 
Socrates himself is wont to believe. His tale may also have provided Socrates the idea 
that daemones are personal entities that all men have (although most are unaware of this 
fact, cf. Crat., 397el-398c3), and who are an important part of the spiritual makeup of a 
true philosopher.
This brief sketch, although far from saying all that could be said, serves to show 
that Socrates’ understanding of the daemon was not purely an invention, but instead 
played an important role in the popular Greek theology at the time. It also lays the 
foundation for our own position concerning the role of the daimonion in the Socratic 
decision-making process. For notice closely, that in all three traditions, the daemones are 
meant to guard actions or ideas about to be done. This is the crucial fact for our debate: 
that in literary tradition before Socrates, daemones guard against foolish actions, not 
against faulty ideas as such.
Ill
Both sides of the disagreement take as a prime text Apology 3 Ic3-32a3.
T3 It may seem strange that while I go around and give advice privately and interfere 
in private affairs, I do not venture to go to the assembly and there advise the city. 
You have heard me give the reason for this in many places. I have a divine or 
spiritual sign [daimonion], which Meletus has ridiculed in his deposition. This 
began when I was a child. It is a voice, and whenever it speaks it turns me away 
from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do anything. This 
is what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, and I think it was 
quite right to prevent me. Be sure, gentlemen of the jury, that if I had long ago 
attempted to take part in politics, I should have died long ago, and benefited 
neither you nor myself.
The question that lies before us is whether this passage should incline us to believe that
Socrates is counting on two disparate avenues of knowledge, rational and extra-rational.
4yielding two systems of justified belief, one of them reached through elenctic argument, 
the other by divine signs, prophetic dreams, oracles, and the like.20 Now, under the 
Vlastosian picture, all Socrates obtains from the daemonic sign at any given time is 
precisely what he calls the daimonion itself -a  divine sign or signal.21 This sign is taken 
to mean nothing more than “Stop!”22 It has no moral or rational content, which, if it did, 
could itself form an intelligible objection to the reasons Socrates had for doing what he 
was about to do prior to the signal. Rather, it simply leads him to desist and only 
afterwards to speculate about its causes with his reason on his own. And as our passage in 
the Apology shows, this is generally just what Socrates does. In support of this portion of 
Vlastos’ view, although he is reluctant to mention it, is the probably spurious Theages 
129d3-5, where Socrates ponders the reasons why the daimonion sounded. “For when the 
good-looking Sannio went out on campaign, the sign came to me; and he’s now with 
Thrasyllus on an expedition to Ephesus and the rest of Ionia. So I suppose he’ll either die 
or else come close to it, and I’m really afraid about the rest of that business.” Socrates 
knows the daimonion signaled him, presumably when he learned of Sannio’s decision to 
join the campaign, which he only retrospectively understands to mean that something 
very bad, probably death, is likely to have befallen his acquaintance.
C.D.C. Reeve argues that this passage suggests that Socrates found in the 
daimonion a source of knowledge, albeit non-rational, which establishes the truth of a 
given idea. “We may conclude not only that he obeys the prohibitions of the daimonion 
without independently justifying them, but that he uses the daimonion to establish truths 
which he could not establish any other way.”23 Socrates always heeds these divine 
warnings, but only, according to Reeve, because he had previously established their 
goodness through elenctically tested opinions about the gods. Because he has determined 
through his natural reason that the gods will never bring harm, his reliance upon 
extrarational influence is forever connected to the veracity of those prior opinions. So, 
while the daimonion is itself a reason, “that reason is not, however, logically independent 
of-indeed, it crucially depends upon- his elenctically sustained beliefs about virtue and 
the gods.”24
Pushing this rationalistic interpretation farther, Vlastos extrapolates from 
Socrates’ retrospective examination of the divine warnings to what, I believe, is a 
precarious position: “ These two commitments cannot conflict because only by the use o f
his own unfettered critical reason can Socrates determine the true meaning o f any o f  
these signs."25 This conclusion takes all the extraordinary force away from the daimonion 
-it nullifies the daimonion’s “threat to the exclusive authority of reason.”26 For Vlastos, 
as for Reeve, Socrates only takes seriously such warnings because he has already 
employed the force of reason to determine that the gods are in every way good and 
cannot possibly do evil. Prior to this belief, however, “He would have to ask himself: do I 
have reason to believe that this is the work the god wants done by me? Is he that sort of 
god? What is his character?”27 Divine signs are relegated to being mere assurances that 
the course of action reason selected was indeed correct. The upshot of this position is that 
the daimonion never really determines the actions in opposition to what Socrates had 
already reasoned he must do. Text T1 trumps text T2; ratiocination trumps the 
daimonion. But why does he believe the daimonion is even an assurance in the first 
place?
5The Second Book of the Republic is sufficient to obviate any doubts that Socrates 
believes the gods do only good.28 But the Vlastos/Reeve position assumes that there is no 
difference between what is given by the gods and the daimonion that comes from the 
daemon attached to Socrates. Both Vlastos and Reeve have decidedly blurred the line 
between the daimonion and ‘every other means through which divine apportionment has 
ever commanded anyone to do anything’.29 However, as I have demonstrated above, 
Greek popular belief kept the two distinct and, moreover, Socrates himself nowhere says 
they are identical. To state my case more strongly: because the daimonion is said to never 
have given insight about what to do, only what not to do -while on the other hand he 
plainly does receive affirmative orders from other extra-rational sources, such as the 
dream commanding him to make music ( Phd60e-61b)- Socrates himself must have
considered the daimonion a special kind of extra-rational inspiration distinct from any 
other form which comes from the gods. This point is perhaps most clear in Socrates’ 
discussion of the various forms of divinely inspired madness in the Phaedrus, none of 
which resembles the daimonion. He says for instance, “Third comes the kind of madness 
that is possession by the Muses, which takes a tender virgin soul and awakens it to a 
Bacchic frenzy of songs and poetry that glorifies the past and teaches them to future 
generations” ( Phdr.245al-3). Certainly, this form of extrarational inspiration appears a 
far cry from the monitions of Socrates’ daimonion.
M.L. McPherran confirms just this objection with a convincing grammatical 
argument. “Just as the daimonion may not be treated as being strictly analogous to 
dreams, neither may it be assimilated with confidence to Socrates’ analysis of ‘inspired’ 
poets or diviners. Such people are possessed by a daemon or a god, but by contrast, 
Socrates never treats the daimonion as a phenomenon of this sort.”30 The very adjectival 
character of το δαιμονdifferentiates it from a straightforward substantive use of
δαιμονor θεόν, and Socrates stresses that it is a voice or sign that comes from such an 
entity. Moreover, the trial of Socrates itself would have been pointless had Socrates and 
the Athenian people believed the daimonion itself counted as a divine being, rather than 
simply, as McPherran says, “a divine doing.”31 For if it had been the opinion of the 
average Athenian citizen that Socrates’ divine sign was the legitimate voice of an 
acknowledged divinity, then the charge of impiety would certainly have seemed 
ridiculous. Now, Vlastos’ arguments for the rational justification of divine signs through 
elenchus have textual support only in the context of god-sent signs.32 My suggestion is 
that we, following McPherran, do not assume off-hand that Socrates would have done so 
with the daimonion as well.
By distinguishing Socrates’ personal divine sign from all other forms of god-sent 
inspiration, we must also assign his proof of the gods’ determination of good things only 
to the domain of those things expressly granted by the gods. The daimonion is simply not 
one of them; it is granted by a daemon, which, if we can assume that Socrates was 
reasonably familiar with the poets and Empedocles, would not necessarily have fallen 
under the protection of that argument. In fact, Homer believed that such a daimonion 
could actually be a very foolish type of monition to follow (cf. Ody. 15.172, 12.38, 
14.488). Empedocles even claimed that the daemones were expelled from the Isle of the 
Blessed on account of their sins committed against divine decrees (fr. 115, 3). There is 
nothing in the popular beliefs to suggest that the work of daemons could be regarded as 
free from mischief. How then, if there is no plain certainty in the Greek literary tradition
6and if Socrates makes no specific argument for their infallibility,33 can the intellectualist 
position of Reeve and Vlastos maintain the assumption that Socrates followed the 
daimonion simply because he had already argued that the gods were necessarily good? 
More importantly, why does Socrates, if he does not rely on a rational justification for the 
infallible goodness of daimonion, nevertheless follow it?
Brickhouse and Smith hold a more plausible answer. Returning to text T3, they 
note that while Socrates does not say so explicitly, it must be taken for granted that, prior 
to the daimonion’s monition that he not enter into politics, Socrates had in fact
considered whether it was best to do so.34 Any rational being, much less Socrates, would 
carefully weigh the benefits and drawbacks of such a life-affecting decision as this. A 
contrary position would have to see Socrates making one of the most important choices in 
his life without any prior deliberation whatsoever, which by itself paradoxically 
undermines the intellectualist reading. Socrates’ reason must have evidently led him to 
believe that the ‘taking part in public affairs’ was right for him. So, following his natural 
reason, he was about to commit himself to such a life. The daimonion signaled him, 
probably saying something like, “don’t enter the political life!” Immediately he desists. 
Notice that Socrates mentions no process of deliberation prior to halting what he was 
about to do. He is never caught wavering upon the s monitions. “The
daimonion offers Socrates no rules of conduct, no general principles, no moral 
definitions; its activity seems always to be unexpected and it offers Socrates no 
explanations of its activity.”35 He is not free to employ “unfettered critical reason to 
determine the true meaning” of this sign. It is only afterwards, and this is marked by the 
very change in the tenses of his story,36 that he realizes the possible reasons why the 
daimonion had signaled him. Only afterwards does he speculate as to why it might have 
prevented him: it probably saved him from being killed and thus from benefiting no one. 
But none of this explains why Socrates quit the action in the first place.
“When Socrates... desists from the action in question -and not once do we find 
Socrates failing to desist after such opposition- he does so in spite o f whatever reasons he 
may have had for taking the action in the first place, reasons which led him to be on the 
verge of taking action, if only his daimonion had not intervened.”37 Socrates must have 
had good reasons for entering politics; for if he had rationally decided that entering 
politics would have resulted in death we may assume that he never would have done so in 
the first place, thus obviating the need for a daemonic monition. So, in this case Socrates 
obeys the warnings of his daimonion even though natural reason had led him to do 
otherwise. Reason might well play a role in Socrates’ later attempt to understand why the 
daimonion might have stopped him, for instance at Theages 129dl-el, where he can only 
speculate as to the reasons why it might have opposed Sannio’s campaign. Immediately 
after that passage Socrates gives the strongest support for the Brickhouse, Smith, and 
McPherran position, “I’ve told you all these things because this spiritual thing 
[daimonion] has absolute power in my dealings [ τα ] with those who associate
with me” (Thg. 129el-4). He may have no idea why the sign stops him at the time it 
signals, but he seems completely and unshakably certain that he must not do what he was 
to do.38 As Brickhouse and Smith imply, Socrates follows the daimonion simply because 
it has never led him astray; his reasons are practical as opposed to theoretical.39 
Xenophon also suggests that Socrates may inductively believe it, because in his long 
experience, it has never been shown not to be a reliable warning system (ApolA3; cf.
7Plato, Ap. 40a2). The reliability of its alarms has been confirmed by the good results that 
flow from heeding it and the tragedies that ensue for others when its warnings are 
ignored.40 Besides, while we do see Socrates defend the goodness of the gods in 
arguments, never once do we find Socrates defending the goodness of the daimonion by 
such arguments. So, instead of a theoretical reason for believing in these divine 
monitions, Socrates has a practical one: he heeds the daimonion because it has never 
failed him.
The upshot of the Brickhouse/Smith position is that Socrates needs no extra 
reasons to follow the commands of the divine signs; the daimonion is itself the reason.41 
“We must not simply assume that Socrates would consider the monitions of his 
daimonion as non-rational signs.”42 This leads to a general reinterpretation of Socratic 
rationality43, which essentially intends to subsume both mysticism and intellectualism 
under the rubric of ‘SocraticisnT. Unfortunately, we do not have time to do justice to 
their complicated exposition here. In any case, the argument is that the monitions of the 
daimonion serve as the reasons to desist from doing an action which reason would 
previously had led him to do. There is no additional epistemological content to interpret, 
as is sometimes the case with other forms of extrarational inspiration, but a sort of ‘stop 
sign’ which does not explain why one ought to stop, only that one must stop. Socrates 
had already made up his mind to act but the divine sign overrides his reason. The 
daemonic monition is a new reason for stopping. Plain is the opposition to the 
Vlastos/Reeve position: here the daimonion “trumps” natural reason.
IV
My own position splits the horns of this dilemma. I believe reason can no more 
“trump” the daimonion than the daimonion can “trump” reason. Instead, I submit that 
they each have authority, but under their two discontinuous domains. I take as evidence 
for this position the fact that Xenophon himself actually reports how Socrates thought 
there were two distinct avenues of inquiry, each appropriate to different subject matters: 
“What the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn; what is hidden 
from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination” (Mem. 1.1.9). Reason 
and daemonic inspiration each have roles to play in a decision making process: reason 
upon things which can be known, divine inspiration upon things which cannot, namely, 
the myriad of unforeseeable possible outcomes for any contingent course of action. Let us 
look more closely at the passages in which Socrates tells us the daimonion comes to him.
At Apology 3 Ic3-32a2, quoted above in full, Socrates explains how the 
daimonion prevented him from entering politics even though he evidently had prior 
rational grounds for doing so. Retrospectively he understands the sign’s monition as 
beneficial, since “had I long ago attempted to take part in politics, I should have died long 
ago.” This rational extrapolation tries to determine why the divine sign might have 
signaled, but in no way can explain why the factors that led to his decision might have 
been mistaken. It does not warn him against a faulty hypothesis or logical inference 
during the course of his deliberation. It does not tell him where his reasoning went 
wrong. In fact, Socrates never learns for certain why the daimonion signals him in a 
given instance. Why would Socrates have been killed? Did he know for a fact that there 
would have been assassins or some such thing awaiting him after a particularly 
controversial speech? Could he have known such a thing? Or was he simply speculating
8at the causes of the divine phenomena’s actions? It seems fairly clear that Socrates does 
not think entering politics is a bad thing in and of itself, but only because the sign 
occurred to him does he think that that action at that moment would have led to disastrous 
results. Socrates never does come to believe that his prior deliberation was somehow 
misguided, but only that for whatever reason he should not act in this case. In fact. Book 
VIII of the Republic clearly shows Socrates extolling the very necessity of a philosopher 
king for the possibility of a truly good city.44 Yet by that time in Socrates’ life the 
daimonion had already prevented him from such a life of his own. How can this be? How 
can argumentation still lead him to believe that the most beneficial thing for a city is the 
rule of a philosopher while he himself -a philosopher- had already been prevented from 
acting upon this belief? This is just my point: the daimonion does not change Socrates’ 
mind about the truth or falsity of the results of his rational inquiry. It only stops his 
actions, never refutes his theories.45
Another occasion of daemonic monition comes at the end of the Apology, “What 
has happened to me now has not happened of itself; but it is clear to me that it was better 
for me to die now and to escape from trouble. That is why my divine sign [daimonion] 
did not oppose me at any point” (ApA\à2-A). In this case, Socrates has several well- 
known arguments supporting his view that death is not harmful to the philosopher (e.g., 
Ap., 40c3-end). The daimonion fails to signal him, which, as a parallel with what we saw 
above, cannot by itself suggest that the arguments for the immortality of the soul or any 
other argument of that sort were infallibly correct. Socrates clearly puts stock in his 
reason, but not because there is no daemonic warning. He had already made up his mind 
what was best; the silenced daimonion only serves to reinforce the determination of his 
action, but not the determination of his truth claim. In fact, he never once awaits the non­
signaling of his sign as a divine approval of any conclusion; nor, for that matter, does the 
sign ever affect him when the argument takes an incorrect turn. His reliance on critical 
reason concerning the truth or falsity of philosophic claims never wavers. In the case of 
the Apology, the absence of the warning merely suggests that his actions in the trial and 
sentencing would not prove harmful to his soul. It never proves that his arguments were 
correct.
A further passage supports this same interpretation. “He [Charmides] once 
happened to be consulting with me when he was just about to train for the race at Nemea. 
As soon as he began to tell me that he was going to train, the voice came and I tried to 
stop him and said, ‘As you were speaking, the voice of the spiritual thing came to me. 
Don’t train!’ - ‘Maybe’, [Charmides] said, ‘its significance is that I won’t win; but even if 
I’m not going to win, I’ll benefit from the exercise I’ll get’” ( ., 128e2-6). Here
Socrates does not seem to have any rational qualms as to why Charmides should not have 
trained at the time. Given his respect for physical exercise, it might even have been the 
case that Socrates agreed to Charmides’ justification of his plans. What certain is that 
Socrates nowhere defends an argument that physical exercise is harmful. The daemonic 
warning does not change his mind in regards to his rational viewpoint concerning the 
benefit or harm of physical exercise any more than it does with respect to the intrinsic 
worth of a wise man ruling the city. It only speaks to the particular actions of Charmides, 
the full results of which no amount of rational gymnastics can predict.
One final text: “It seems to me Socrates, that we should do this: let’s test this 
spiritual thing by associating with one another. If it allows us, then that’s what’s best; if
9not, then we’ll immediately think about what we should do -whether to go and associate 
with someone else, or try to appease the divine thing that comes to you with prayers and 
sacrifices and any other way the diviners might suggest” (Thg., 131al-5). Here Theages 
and Socrates cannot agree on the basis of reason alone whether it would be beneficial for 
Theages to undertake an educational apprenticeship under the elder Socrates. They have 
not reached a definitive course of action by use of their reason alone and, so, await the *■ 
signal or non-signal of the daimonion to see if the course of action will be beneficial or 
harmful. The theoretical benefit of proper education, however, is never under question. 
Only in this case, for reasons he could not possibly foresee, for this action Socrates is 
about to undertake, do he and young Theages put their faith in the divine sign for its 
monition concerning the action about to be done.
V
In light of everything that has been said, I suggest we look once more at text Tl. 
“Not now for the first time but always, I am the sort of man who is persuaded by nothing 
in me except the proposition which appears to me best when I reason about it." 
Emphasized in this way, the passage makes perfect sense for a man with both a 
commitment to follow reason wherever it may lead and a commitment to heed 
extrarational signals whenever they occur. Contra McPherran, Brickhouse, and Smith, 
Socrates does in fact follow only natural reason concerning the truth or falsity of a given 
proposition. Contra Vlastos and Reeve, the argument is followed only when he reasons 
about it, not when he acts upon it.
Socrates’ natural reason, in contrast to the daimonion, has sovereign influence 
with respect to elenctic investigation concerning truth claims. The divine sign never 
influences Socrates’ deliberation about the best course of action in a given circumstance. 
It never uncovers what action best reflects the nature of goodness. However, once the 
deliberation is complete and the conclusion is to become an action, the monition of the 
daimonion takes control. If it does not signal him, then the action he is about to do will 
not likely bring him any serious harm. But if.it does, if it says, “Stop!” then Socrates will 
quit his action immediately and without deliberation. Reason has its influence over the 
domain of theoretical understanding; the daimonion provides direction concerning the 
advisability of a particular action. Reason cannot foresee all the results that will follow 
the course of action already deemed best. The daimonion does not inform him about the 
truth or falsity of a certain hypothesis. Reason and the daimonion do not “trump” one 
another. Because they each have their own domains of influence, Socrates can and does 
maintain both his commitments -both to natural reason and to the promptings of his 
divine sign.
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